Whitehead was critical with respect to Poincaré’s conventionalism. However, Whitehead stood closer to Poincaré than Bertrand Russell when Russell invoked Poincaré’s conventionalism to highlight that the choice between Arthur Eddington’s orthodox interpretation of Einstein’s general theory of relativity on the one hand, and Whitehead’s alternative interpretation on the other, is not a matter of empirical fact, but a matter of convention. Whitehead shared two of the premises of Poincaré’s conventionalism: the physics-independence of geometry, and the choice of a physical (...) geometry amongst geometries of constant curvature. This contributed significantly to his philosophical critique of Einstein, who held that the geometry of space-time depends on the physical distribution of matter, and that the non-homogeneity of this distribution (e.g., at the scale of the solar system) implies that the appropriate physical geometry is variably curved. Russell’s conventionalism, contrary to Whitehead’s view, did not take Poincaré’s premises into account, was shared by the logical positivists, and led to a philosophical defense of Einstein. (shrink)

In 1922 in The Principle of Relativity, Whitehead presented an alternative theory of gravitation in response to Einstein’s general relativity. To the latter, he objected on philosophical grounds—specifically, that Einstein’s notion of a variable spacetime geometry contingent on the presence of matter (a) confounds theories of measurement, and, more generally, (b) is unacceptable within the bounds of a reasonable epistemology. Whitehead offered instead a theory based within a comprehensive philosophy of nature. The formulal Whitehead adopted for the gravitational (...) field has been described as involving both the flat metric nu, of Minkowski spacetime and a dynamic metric gu, dependent on the presence of source masses. The ontological relationship between the two must be fleshed out in the context of Whitehead’s philosophy of nature. The relationship is of some importance, not only in casting Whitehead’s theory within its proper metaphysical context vis-d—vis Einstein, but also in judging how the theory has faired empirically with respect to general relativity (GR hereafter). It makes the same predictions as GR with respect to the perihelion advance, the deflection of light rays and the gravitational red-shift; indeed, Eddington (1924) has shown that it is equivalent to the Schwarzschild solution of Einstein’s held equations for the one-body problem. However, it also appears to predict an anisotropy in the locally measured gravitational constant y that is in conflict.. (shrink)

This article addresses both philosophers of science and process philosophers. It shows that the acceptance of Einstein's general theory of relativity by British physicists in the early 1920s, and their rejection of Whitehead's experimentally indistinguishable theory of gravity, was a matter not only of empirical evaluation but also of aesthetic preference. To philosophers of science it offers a historical case study illustrating the entangled roles of empirical and aesthetic criteria in theory evaluation. To process philosophers it offers an answer (...) to the question of why Whitehead's alternative rendering of Einstein's general relativity has been neglected both by the majority of physicists, and by the majority of philosophers. (shrink)

This chapter of Victor Lowe's Alfred North Whitehead: The Man and His Work, Volume II: 1910-1947 covers the development of Whitehead's philosophy of physics while he was Professor of Applied Mathematics at the Imperial College, London. Under the influence of Einstein's theory of relativity, Whitehead developed a theory of extension that explained the basis of the space-time manifold in terms of an ontology of events. Pan-physics was his term for the unification of the natural sciences as one general science.

ABSTRACT:Analytic philosophers have criticized A. N. Whitehead's metaphysics for being obscure, yet several such philosophers have espoused positions in metaphysics and philosophy of mind that were advanced by Whitehead in the 1920s. In this paper, we evaluate the merits and demerits of these criticisms by Bertrand Russell, W. V. Quine, Karl Popper, and others and then demonstrate the affinities and contrasts in the positions advanced by Galen Strawson, David Chalmers, Thomas Nagel, and Whitehead regarding so-called ‘analytic panexperientialism’.

A critique of Whitehead’s conccpt of God from the standpoint of absolute idealism in general and of Hegel and Whitehead’s relation to Hegel in particular.

Gottfried Martin has recently reminded us of a useful distinction between two possible ways of doing metaphysics. We may proceed by framing a “theory of principles” or by proposing a “theory of being”. Aristotle explicitly formulates both possibilities as the task of metaphysics, formulating a theory of principles in his doctrine of the four types of causal explanation in the first book of the Metaphysics, while exploring the theory of being in a number of other passages, such as Book I, (...) chapters 6 and 9; Book X, chapter 2; and Book XIII. These passages do not elaborate principles whereby we can analyze the structure of certain entities, be they causes, substances or forms, but rather concern themselves with the ontological status of these entities—in what sense can they be said to be? In Plato this distinction is more implicit, but we may contrast the theory of forms developed in the Phaedo and the Republic with the subsequent probing investigation of the being of these forms in the Parmenides and the Sophist. Kant “explicitly claims to have discovered and presented a complete and necessary system of the basic concepts and principles. The proof of the completeness and necessity of this system is the aim of the middle part of the Critique of Pure Reason, the Transcendental Analytic.” Yet. (shrink)

A critique of Whitehead’s conccpt of God from the standpoint of absolute idealism in general and of Hegel and Whitehead’s relation to Hegel in particular.

Whitehead's metaphysics contains an accurate portrayal of concrete human existence - one which can serve as a ground for criticizing the abstractions into which liberalism has fallen. His critical individualism, his insistence both on the individual as the seat of all value and on our essential connectedness to one another in modern society, is a call for liberalism to restore concrete meaning to its fundamental notions of individuality and freedom. However, his suggestions that the core values of liberalism can be (...) actualized if we but reaffirm Plato's ancient equation of knowledge with virtue rests on an optimism that is difficult to sustain apart from a compensatory metaphysical dogma. We can appropriate Whitehead's criticism of liberalism, but if we can no longer convince ourselves of a metaphysical vision that supports faith in Plato's equation, we must look elsewhere for suggestions as to how liberalism can be revitalized. (shrink)

When The Concept of Nature by Alfred North Whitehead was first published in 1920 it was declared to be one of the most important works on the relation between philosophy and science for many years, and several generations later it continues to deserve careful attention. Whitehead explores the fundamental problems of substance, space and time, and offers a criticism of Einstein's method of interpreting results while developing his own well-known theory of the four-dimensional 'space-time manifold'. With a specially commissioned (...) new preface written by Michael Hampe, this book is presented in a fresh series livery for the twenty-first century for a new generation of readers. (shrink)

Call a term ‘pseudo-singular’ if it is syntactically singular but semantically plural. ‘The pair who wrote Principia’ is a good example, standing as it does for the two individuals, Whitehead and Russell. In this journal (2021), Eric Snyder and Stewart Shapiro launched an attack on the idea, calling it ‘linguistically and logically untenable.’ In this reply we rebut every one of their criticisms.

The problem causation poses is: how can we ever know more than a Humean regularity. The problem consciousness poses is: how can subjective phenomenal experience arise from something lacking experience. A recent turn in the consciousness debates suggest that the hard problem of consciousness is nothing more than the Humean problem of explaining any causal nexus in an intelligible way. This involution of the problems invites comparison with the theories of Alfred North Whitehead, who also saw them related in this (...) way. According to Whitehead, a tempting but false phenomenology of consciousness obscures temporality and leads to the causation problem, which then makes consciousness itself seem causally inexplicable. Bringing the processual nature of consciousness back into view discloses causation at work in the moment-to-moment emergence of consciousness, and it reveals that causation operates in a logically fuzzy domain where the skeptical critique of causality finds no foothold. (shrink)

In addition to his brilliant achievements in theoretical mathematics, Alfred North Whitehead exercised an extensive knowledge of philosophy and literature that informs and elevates all of his works. In this book, he offers undergraduate students and other readers an absorbing exploration of the fundamental problems of substance, space, and time. The Concept of Nature originated with Whitehead's Tarner Lectures of 1919, and its discussions are highlighted by a criticism of Einstein's method of interpreting results, and by the author's alternative (...) development of the celebrated theory of the four-dimensional space-time manifold. 1920 ed. (shrink)

Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) was a prominent English mathematician and philosopher who co-authored the highly influential Principia Mathematica with Bertrand Russell. Originally published in 1922, this book forms the follow-up volume to "The Principles of Natural Knowledge" (1919) and "The Concept of Nature" (1920). In it, Whitehead puts forward an alternative theory of relativity, one which goes against the heterogeneity of Einstein's later theories in deducing that 'our experience requires and exhibits a basis in uniformity'. The text is divided (...) into three parts - 'General Principles', 'Physical Applications', and 'Elementary Theory of Tensors' - and exhibits a characteristically ambitious approach in mixing various academic disciplines. This is a fascinating book that will be of value to anyone with an interest in natural science, physics, and philosophy, together with the history of science. (shrink)

A. N. Whitehead's approach to physical theorizing contrasts with that of mainstream or official physics in being centrally concerned with articulating a background explanation of physical facts and phenomena in general that would take the place of the “ether” of classical physics, a project otherwise unpursued by the science in its modern period. Unlike Einstein's, Whitehead's approach to relativity primarily seeks explanation rather than utility ; also, it avoids the philosophical problems with Einstein's theory alleged by Whitehead and (...) a range of other philosophers. This stops short of a finding as to the comparative worth of Whitehead's alternative basis for quantitative formulations. (shrink)

From a discussion of Einstein’s theories to an analysis of meaning, the philosopher offers a fascinating collection of essays on a wide range of topics. This is a collection of many of Whitehead’s papers that are scattered elsewhere. It was the penultimate book he published, and represents his mature thoughts on many topics. Philosophical Library has done a great service by publishing a representative collection of his writings on the subjects of Philosophy, Education and Science. The portion on Philosophy (...) includes five papers: “Immortality”, “Mathematics and the Good”, “Process and Reality”, “John Dewey and His Influence” and the “Analysis of Meaning.” The first three chapters consist of Whitehead’s personal reflections illumined by flashes of his lively humor. They are picturesque and amusing. The remainder of the book consists of chapters on Philosophy, Education, and Science. They cover in depth his positions on many scientific and philosophical matters in an extraordinarily unified way. The final section of the book is devoted to excellent surveys of Geometry and Mathematics as well as a paper on Einstein’s theories. (shrink)

As interest in Huayan thought among Western scholars has grown over the last few decades, a number of individuals have noted similarities between A. N. Whitehead's ideas of reality as a process of arising actual occasions and Huayan doctrines concerning the interdependent arising of dharmas. Comparisons of the two systems do show striking similarities, but as Steve Odin has pointed out, one area of noteworthy difference may be their views of temporal passage.1 There seems to be clear agreement among Whitehead (...) scholars that his view requires temporal asymmetry such that the present arises as a creative advance toward an open future. In contrast, Huayan is well known for advocating a symmetrical view of reality, and the Huayan view of time, it has been argued, is no exception. On this basis some have suggested that in accounting for and even requiring an open future, Whitehead's views effectively allow for a free advance of becoming that may not be possible within the context of Huayan views. But is this the case? -/- By examining sections of Fazang's works that specifically deal with tense and temporal passage, we will see that the typical view of Huayan as advocating a temporally symmetrical notion of passage is only partially accurate. Even further, it is apparent in light of that material that the Whiteheadian critique of Huayan is partly inaccurate as well. It is this latter point that may mean Huayan views allow for a type of becoming that Whitehead's cannot. To see how this is the case, it will be helpful to briefly summarize the Whiteheadian critique before focusing on key elements of Fazang's view. (shrink)

Pols' critique of whitehead's account of freedom in "whitehead's metaphysics" focuses the problem sharply. freedom requires radically reflexive self-determination of an event by itself. this is intelligible only on an atomic view of time such as whitehead's. genetic succession within occasions is non-temporal and must not be so construed that their character is jeopardized.

The thrust of the argument presented in this paper is that phenomenological ontology survives the criticism of “correlationism” as advanced by speculative realism, a movement that has evolved in continental philosophy over the past decade. Correlationism is the position, allegedly occupied by phenomenology, that presupposes the ontological primacy of the human subject. Phenomenology survives this criticism not because the criticism misses its mark, but because phenomenology occupies a position that is broader than that of correlationism. With its critique of (...) correlationism, speculative realism rightly identifies a battle that no longer needs to be fought: the battle against 19th century brands of mechanical realism. Free from the impatient and defensive posturing against the mechanization of the human, phenomenology is also free to explore the world beyond its emphasis on human experience. Doing so requires a return to Husserl's discussion of hylé and the “twofold bed” of phenomenology. Phenomenology may emphasize hylé – that is, material; or it may emphasize nous – the world as it appears to or is transformed by consciousness. By returning to Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, a case is made for hyletic phenomenology. Hyletic phenomenology allows for ontological reversibility and recognizes the “unhuman” elements in things. It is hyletic phenomenology that grounds phenomenological ontology after the critique of correlationism has been assessed. (shrink)

A Thomistic ontology of spacetime seems impossible, given Thomas Aquinas’s (1224–1275) outdated science and mathematics. By extension, it would seem that his modern followers are foolhardy to attempt to defend such a view. Indeed, a critique of Jacques Maritain by Adolf Grünbaum proceeds apace, dismantling his attempts to save Thomistic philosophical realism from Einstein. However, Grünbaum’s attack was given in better form thirty years prior by the Belgian Thomist Charles De Koninck. The two critiques are analyzed here. De (...) Koninck’s arguments are superior to Grünbaum’s due to their greater precision as refutations as well as their more adequate ontology of spacetime, made possible but not explicit in Thomistic philosophy. (shrink)

A reading of Marx's critique of capitalism through the lens of process philosophy.

A systematic critique of the notion that natural science is the sovereign domain of truth, Critique of Scientific Reason uses an extensive and detailed investigation of physics—and in particular of Einstein's theory of relativity—to argue that the positivistic notion of rationality is not only wrongheaded but false. Kurt Hübner contends that positivism ignores both the historical dimension of science and the basic structures common to scientific theory, myth, and so-called subjective symbolic systems. Moreover, Hübner argues, positivism has (...) led in our time to a widespread disillusionment with science and technology. (shrink)

Alfred North Whitehead 's treatise Universal Algebra classifies algebras as either non-numerical or numerical according to whether they satisfy the law of idempotency, a + a = a. We undertake a technical critique of this classification scheme and examine how its flaws may reflect certain mathematical and philosophical biases in Whitehead 's outlook. We argue further that Whitehead 's presumption of immutable foundations for mathematics and his early commitment to the priority of objects over relations may in part account (...) for his relative obscurity as a mathematician. (shrink)

Through a reading of Sindiwe Magona’s Mother to Mother (1998), this article assesses claims for the empathetic potential of reading fiction, as a means of promoting cross-racial understanding. Drawing on feminist theorists Ann Cvetkovich, Clare Hemmings, and Sara Ahmed, I uncover the modes of political critique that can reside in resisting affective identification, and position Magona’s rejection of empathetic cross-racial connection as a critique of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). I focus particularly on Magona’s representation (...) of black motherhood, and argue that Mother to Mother seeks to inscribe the systematic violation of the maternal relation under apartheid – a form of violence that was not registered by the TRC – and also to position the black mother’s affective experience outside of the empathetic reach of the white mother, precisely because it is embedded in a long history of social, political, and material dispossession. (shrink)

IN DEBATES CONCERNING the relationship between basic principles of Whiteheadian process philosophy and the classical doctrine of substance, one can distinguish at least three types of essentially different approaches to the discussed issue: Process metaphysics implies definitive rejection of substantialist categories of traditional philosophy, and introduces a radically new perspective in which notions of flux and change replace the former categories of enduring substances and relative immutability of individual subjects. Whitehead's approach to the traditional doctrine of substance results in a (...) strong critique of it but not in total rejection. Certain elements of the Aristotelian and Cartesian legacy must be critically revised, but they cannot be eliminated from a rational interpretation of nature. Their implicit presence in Whiteheadian interpretative schemes substantiates the opinion that process metaphysics introduces a reformed version of the doctrine of substance. In spite of explicit critique of the concept of substance found in Whitehead's texts, the same texts implicitly presuppose the necessity of reference to certain substantialist categories. Whitehead himself did not always formally recognize such a necessity; his metaphysical assertions, however, provide an objective basis for developing a modified theory of substance. (shrink)

This book presents Robert S. Hartman’s formal theory of value and critically examines many other twentieth century value theorists in its light, including A.J. Ayer, Kurt Baier, Brand Blanshard, Paul Edwards, Albert Einstein, William K. Frankena, R.M. Hare, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Heidegger, G.E. Moore, P.H. Nowell-Smith, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Charles Stevenson, Paul W. Taylor, Stephen E. Toulmin, and J.O. Urmson.

A rejection of the notion of substance, an emphasis on intraworldly experience and an incorporation of ideas from modern biology are just three of the distinctive features of Alfred North Whitehead’s process metaphysics or philosophy of organism. The last two features give his scheme a heavily naturalistic tinge, despite his positing of eternal objects or universal forms of definiteness, which - together with subjective aims or final causes - are instantiated in a divinity prior to worldly realization.1 Such a naturalism (...) might seem to preclude largely a comparison with the work of Jacques Derrida, with other differences between the two being left aside. Derrida began his career as a student of phenomenology and structuralism, and by far the greater number of his philosophical writings has been devoted to thinkers who are explicitly post-Kantian. Yet this does not mean that he is a transcendental philosopher who abandons experience and the empirical world in favour of language and consciousness. In this paper I argue that Derrida’s work - which has been shown to be heavily informed by systems theory and evolutionary biology - is not in fact shut off from the extra-conscious and extra-linguistic dimensions of actuality. I also suggest that his deconstructive approach is strikingly similar to Whitehead’s in rejecting essentialism, namely, the idea of fixed and determined essences that underlie accidental properties and changes. From a Derridean perspective, one might even see Whitehead’s alternative as insufficiently radical, since it seems to posit not just eternal objects and God, but a cosmology in which the most fundamental beings or “actual entities” undergo no essential changes or mutations in their respective histories. It is arguable, however, that the latter conclusion would only be consequent on a restrictive interpretation of the pathways of process possible in Whitehead’s metaphysics.. (shrink)

Joseph A. Bracken, S.J,. is one of the more significant North American theologians of the past 40 years. With 12 monographs, two edited or co-edited volumes, over 150 articles, numerous professional and popular conference presentations and media appearances, he is one of the foremost interlocutors in contemporary theological discourse. Having developed and consistently defended a comprehensive and intellectually rigorous worldview that combines the modern and classical Christian worldviews, Bracken has accomplished an invaluable service to the academy, the church, and the (...) world. He has not favored a particular theological or philosophical system, past or present. Instead, he culls what he judges to be true and good in a myriad of seemingly prima facie noncompossible thinkers and systems with divergent programs. Synthesizing the Catholic intellectual tradition and process-relational metaphysics, Bracken also incorporates aspects of German and Anglo-American Idealism, Pragmatism, recent philosophy of science, and a litany of past and present theologians and philosophers. The present volume is a Festschrift to honor Bracken’s career and accomplishments. It differs from the standard Festschrift genre in that the contributors, while certainly explicating and reflecting upon various aspects of his comprehensive worldview, offer their original contributions n a variety of topics. They do in dialogue with Bracken’s positions, simply as starting points, not as end points. The common theme of the Festschrift, then, is serious reflection on and in some cases critique of Bracken’s comprehensive process-relational, Catholic, and Trinitarian worldview and its pertinence for work in contemporary theology from a given perspective. Yet there is a certain richness coming from the diverse perspectives of the contributors whose work intersects with Bracken’s, and not always in terms of process thought per se. The contributors come from diverse backgrounds, not only in process and Roman Catholic theology but also including even other academic disciplines. They represent a balance of senior and junior scholars, and of genders. (shrink)

Simone Weil is widely recognized today as one of the profound religious thinkers of the twentieth century. Yet while her interpretation of natural science is critical to Weil's overall understanding of religious faith, her writings on science have received little attention compared with her more overtly theological writings. The present essay, which builds on Vance Morgan's Weaving the World: Simone Weil on Science, Necessity, and Love (2005), critically examines Weil's interpretation of the history of science. Weil believed that mathematical science, (...) for the ancient Pythagoreans a mystical expression of the love of God, had in the modern period degenerated into a kind of reification of method that confuses the means of representing nature with nature itself. Beginning with classical (Newtonian) science's representation of nature as a machine, and even more so with the subsequent assimilation of symbolic algebra as the principal language of mathematical physics, modern science according to Weil trades genuine insight into the order of the world for symbolic manipulation yielding mere predictive success and technological domination of nature. I show that Weil's expressed desire to revive a Pythagorean scientific approach, inspired by the "mysterious complicity" in nature between brute necessity and love, must be recast in view of the intrinsically symbolic character of modern mathematical science. I argue further that a genuinely mystical attitude toward nature is nascent within symbolic mathematical science itself. (shrink)

Why does the air-target and its associated practices matter? This special section is about the politics, practices and ethics surrounding the target and efforts to subvert or circumvent them. Since Eyal Weizman’s groundbreaking essay on the ‘politics of verticality’ in 2002, there have been numerous attempts to critically open up the aerial gaze, but rarely have they come together for sustained analysis and critique, to explore the implications of the air-target’s techniques, processes, visual cultures and aesthetics for politics and (...) life itself. This special section brings together leading international experts in order to open out a fuller and more complete analysis of the kinds of tensions of verticality that lie at the heart of today’s warfare, security and politics. This introduction outlines three dominant problematics of the air-target, which the articles in the section will go on to explore in more detail. (shrink)

This useful anthology comprises seventy-nine selections arranged under three headings. Part I is titled "Ancient and Classical Ideas of Space"; part II, "The Classical and Ancient Concepts of Time"; part III, "Modern Views of Space and Time and their Anticipations." According to the general editors of the Boston series, R. S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky, Capek’s choice of contents was governed by the desire to show that "parts of our view of nature greatly and mutually influence other parts, and (...) that our conception of the world keeps evolving. Thus, ideas of time intertwine with ideas of space, and both with ideas of matter and force." F. M. Cornford’s essays, "The Invention of Space" and "The Elimination of Time by Parmenides," introduce parts I and II respectively. In part I, while Descartes, Pascal, Gassendi, Newton, etc., speak for themselves, the ancients and medievals are given other mouthpieces—Duhem’s monumental Le système du monde, for Plato, Aristotle, and the medievals; C. Bailey, for Leucippus, Epicurus and Lucretius; Koyré, Höffding, Jammer, for the period from Bradwardine to William Gilbert. On the subject of time, however, both ancient and classical authors are allowed to express their opinions in their own words, with the understandable exception of the Stoics. Part III begins with the prerelativistic critique of Newton as well as the well-known Clarke-Leibniz discussion on the nature of space and time. This third part, however, is dominated largely by the implications of Einstein’s general and special relativity theories. For instance, we have Minkowski’s "Union of Space and Time." Four items, at least, are devoted to the twin-paradox. Some argue for a static, subjective, or even idealistic conception of space-time whereas positivists like Frank attack Sir James Jeans’ and other idealistic interpretations of relativity as instances of meaningless metaphysics. Part III concludes with Weyl’s objectivistic interpretation of quantum-mechanical indeterminacy. While it is difficult to find an anthology that will please all readers or teachers, this work goes far towards dealing comprehensively with the subject of space and time. As Cohen and Wartofsky note, what is distinctive of Capek’s approach within the field of philosophy of nature and its history is that "he is greatly appreciative of Bergson, James, Peirce and Whitehead" and though influenced by them, he is also critical because of the "understanding of the philosophical import that contemporary physics brings into our picture of the world." In a lengthy introduction, the editor explains his rationale for each item he includes. In general this is very helpful, but in some instances the suggested historical connections are misleading at best, if not simply false or questionable. Einstein for instance is said to have "rejected any absolute frame of reference which would be a substrate of absolutely simultaneous events... within the context of Michelson’s vain search for the absolute motion of the earth." This seems to imply—as many others have claimed—that the negative results of the ether-drift experiment influenced Einstein in formulating his relativity theory, whereas historians have pointed out that if Einstein referred to the experiment, it would have to be as a confirmation of his theory, since he did not learn of the results obtained by Michelson and Morley until after the publication of his revolutionary paper in 1905. Though there are other generalizations in the introduction which might be open to dispute, Capek’s prefatory remarks are in general helpful, and the essay collection as a whole stands on its own feet. It is valuable, if for no other reason, that a number of the selections appear in English translation for the first time.—A.B.W. (shrink)

Cooper’s book criticizes the traditional "absolutist" Christian doctrine of God, as exemplified in Aquinas, and concludes with a constructive chapter on "Redemption and Process Theism." His critique is chiefly Hartshornean, not Whiteheadian in character. Cooper, adding nothing of substance to Hartshorne’s extant critique, instead scrutinizes the Thomistic texts to show just how and where the difficulties noted by Hartshorne arise. The final chapter, which leans heavily on Whitehead is chiefly a summary of the usual charges against process theism, (...) together with most of the standard process replies. The deepest difficulty, as the author sees it, lies in showing that Whitehead’s God can guarantee ultimate security or redemption in the face of ineradicable pain and evil; to show this requires reconceiving nature and redemption as well as God. Here Cooper is perhaps open to charges of occasional misinterpretation: For example, is it true that for Whitehead the fact of divine existence is "an ultimate irrationality,... an everlasting given"? And can actuality be separated from concreteness? (shrink)

Description: In the present work which is a critique of Vedanta the author has applied Dr. A.N. Whitehead's approach to philosophy and in particular his definition of an entity which entails a process metaphysics. Having deeply studied the ultimate metaphysical positions of the Vedantic School of thought, he has subjected the three well-known systems of Advaita, Visistadvaita and Dvaita to a critical analysis in the light of rational metaphysics based on an adequate analysis of our common and immediate experience (...) in its widest scope. This book is an original attempt which is bound to stimulate new thinking among protagonists of India's Vedanta philosophy. This work is an unprecedented critical exposition of the logical structure of three main Vedantic schools and merits consideration by all lovers of truth in philosophy. (shrink)

This Element examines the entirety of Kant's Critique of Taste with particular emphasis on its political and moral aims. Kant's critical treatment of aesthetic judgment is both an extended theoretical response to influential predecessors and contemporaries, including Rousseau and Herder, and a practical intervention in its own right meant to nudge history forward at a time of civilizational crisis. Attention to these themes helps resolve a number of puzzles, both textual and philosophic, including the normative force and meaning of (...) judgments of taste, and the relation between natural and artful beauty. (shrink)

Stolz's primary concern is to interject Whitehead's thought into the contemporary scientific situation. He holds that Whitehead's development primarily proceeds out the scientific discussion of his time and only secondarily from the current philosophical discussion. He believes that the scientific community will be more open to this foundational reflection, so he has concentrated on the earlier material.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Religion and Science: Nishitani’s View of Nihility and Emptiness–A Pure Land Buddhist CritiqueRyusei TakedaIn general, philosophical critique of Nishida, Tanabe, and Nishitani, the so-called Kyoto school, has been mainly conducted from a Zen Buddhist perspective. One should not, however, overlook the fact that a profound regard for the philosophical aspects of Pure Land Buddhist thought, another major stream of Mahayana Buddhism, is deeply intertwined in the foundation of (...) their philosophies. But the ways in which they interpret it and the position they give it within their philosophical systems are not the same: they have taken different forms, often giving rise to original terminology, in accord with each thinker’s metaphysical speculation.As Alfred N. Whitehead critically argues in his Religion in the Making, the fundamental reason for the decay of both Buddhism and Christianity is that “each religion has unduly sheltered itself from the other. The self-sufficient pedantry of learning and the confidence of ignorant zealots have combined to shut up each religion in its own forms of thought. Instead of looking to each other for deeper meanings, they have remained self-satisfied and unfertilized.” Further, “both have suffered from the rise of the third tradition, which is science, because neither of them had retained the requisite flexibility of adaptation.” 1In this contemporary situation, the philosophies of Nishida, Tanabe, and Nishitani, in which the issue of religion and science has been brought into fundamental question and examined on the dimension of origin of their development, have extremely important implications for the critical interpretation of Pure Land Buddhist doctrines, particularly in the postmodern world. 2There are two points I want to make in this paper. First, the fundamental structure of Pure Land Buddhism, in a way an antipode to Zen, will be examined in light of Nishitani’s metaphysical analysis of the relationship between human experience and the laws of nature, particularly bringing into focus his existential realization of ‘nihility.’And second, I want to challenge Nishitani’s understanding of ‘emptiness’ from my perspective as a Pure Land Buddhist, and also to uncover some fundamental [End Page 155] problems underlying his view of ‘emptiness’ by attempting to relate it to Nagarjuna’s negation of ‘substance’ in his concept of ‘non-self being,’ or ‘nih-svabhava.’ 3What is Religion for Nishida, Tanabe, and Nishitani?Before getting into those two topics, I want to make a rough sketch indicating about where Nishida, Tanabe, and Nishitani see that religious experience is to be truly realized.The starting point of Nishida’s understanding of religion is found in his argument that “it is on the ground of fact that religion ought to be considered.” The fact of religious experience is in his view none other than self-awareness of ‘absolute nothingness,’ which is also the foundation of what we consider as objective knowledge. The self-awareness manifests itself in the midst of such fact and serves to reveal that fact. He argues that the ultimate goal of Mahayana Buddhism is to penetrate into the depth of this fact.In Tanabe’s philosophy, one’s resurrection and return to the world (genso) and self-renunciation through ‘metanoetics’ (zangedo), a philosophy of absolute Other-power, are required and witnessed to in order for one to establish a genuine religious standpoint. Neither/nor, instead of both/and, is the only relationship in which the self negates itself by means of contradiction, so that at the same time as the self is extinguished in the negation, the contradiction of that which opposes the self is also extinguished. Converted into the neither/nor relationship, both self and contradiction cease to be contradictory opposites. 4 This is Tanabe’s criticism directed at Nishida’s notion of the self-identity of absolute contradiction. Nothingness can never be intuited as such self-identity. The self-consciousness of nothingness is only in resurrection and return to the world, which is witnessed to through practice based upon faith and performed in obedience to Other-power. 5For Nishitani the question of the essence of religion must be answered through tracing the process of the genuine pursuit of true reality. He attempts to interpret the religious quest... (shrink)